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vi          Protracted Conflict: Protection Challenges for Humanitarian Agencies
When refugees resettle to new countries, 
populations left behind are affected. These 
include remaining camp residents, political 
leaders and local residents. This report 
presents a preliminary forecast of the 
impacts to remaining populations of the mass 
resettlement of Bhutanese refugees currently 
residing in Nepal. In summary, the forecast 
is mixed for the remaining population, with 
some aspects of life expected to improve 
while other elements may worsen.
As resettlement moves forward, morale has 
wavered between hopeful and tense. There 
have been violent and even fatal clashes 
between refugees who oppose resettlement 
and those who support it. This has resulted 
in a highly charged camp atmosphere 
in which hope, resentment, and anxiety 
have all played significant roles. A lack of 
information about the resettlement process 
is compounded by the reluctance of many 
refugees to show an interest in resettlement 
for fear of being attacked. 
As large numbers of refugees depart from the 
camps, common resources (such as firewood) 
will be more readily available and camp 
facilities less overcrowded. At the same time, 
the likely depletion of educated, skilled 
and experienced workers could reduce the 
quality of camp services, particularly in the 
health and education sectors.
Overseas remittances will likely increase as 
refugees resettle to richer countries. However, 
informal income from regional or local 
work may decrease as educated and skilled 
refugees resettle early.
Spates of violent attacks associated with the 
advent of resettlement in and near the refugee 
camps represent a clear deterioration of 
the security environment. In response, the 
Government of Nepal has brought in a larger 
police presence, which may reduce overall 
crime but could simultaneously lead to a more 
restrictive environment in which refugees 
cannot travel outside of the camps. 
Bhutanese political leaders fear that 
resettlement will dilute the efforts of refugees 
who continue to promote political reform in 
Bhutan, as their cause loses its urgency and 
its constituents. Conversely, resettlement may 
lead to an injection of resources and media 
attention for political leaders.
For local residents living near the camps 
in Nepal, the departure of large numbers 
of refugees will decrease competition for 
local resources and employment. In the 
long-term, however, resettlement will lead 
to a contraction of the local economy and 
a reduction in the pool of available human 
capital. 
The social, economic and political impacts 
of resettlement have the potential to improve 
conditions for remaining populations and/
or exacerbate current problems. This report 
concludes with policy and program responses 
designed to reinforce the positive aspects of 
resettlement while mitigating the negative 
consequences. 
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In 1990, tens of thousands of Lhotshampas – 
Nepali-speaking minority groups from Bhutan’s 
southern regions – fled from Bhutan in the face 
of discrimination and forced displacement. After 
crossing through India, they sought refuge in 
Nepal. Today, more than 107,000 Lhotshampas 
live in 7 refugee camps in Nepal’s eastern Jhapa 
and Morang districts, where they have remained 
in legal limbo, claimed as citizens by neither 
Bhutan nor Nepal.1
After 18 years, a lasting solution to the plight 
of Lhotshampa refugees is now available. In 
March 2008, over 100 Lhotshampa refugees 
boarded planes to the U.S., one of several 
countries that have agreed to resettle this refugee 
population. Other countries to offer resettlement 
to the Lhotshampas include New Zealand, 
Canada, Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway 
and Australia.2 There is no limit on the number 
of camp residents who can be resettled, and 
now that the Government of Nepal (GoN) has 
begun issuing exit visas for those accepted for 
resettlement, it is estimated that the process of 
resettling all who are accepted for resettlement 
will take between five and seven years.3 As of 
May 2008, the Office of the UN High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in Nepal 
has already received nearly 30,000 expressions 
of interest in resettlement, representing nearly 
one-third of the entire refugee population.
The anticipation and excitement felt by some 
refugees is not shared by all, however. Some 
refugees are ambivalent about moving so far 
away permanently. Others oppose resettlement in 
principle, arguing that resettlement weakens the 
claims of those who want to return to Bhutan. The 
passion surrounding the issue of resettlement has 
resulted in threats of violence and even physical 
clashes between refugees inside and outside the 
camps, resulting in several injuries and the death 
of at least one camp resident.
The departure of large numbers of refugees over 
a relatively short period of time will significantly 
alter the camp population and structure. As with 
any significant change, this one will have both 
positive and negative impacts on the remaining 
refugees – those who don’t want to resettle, those 
who cannot resettle and those who haven’t yet 
resettled – and surrounding communities. As the 
resettlement program gets under way, there is 
a need to anticipate some of these changes, so 
that non-governmental organisations (NGOs) 
and policymakers can craft policies that 
reinforce the positive aspects of resettlement 
while developing policies and programs to 
address the negative consequences. 
This report presents a preliminary forecast 
of the impacts of resettlement on those who 
remain.4 It draws on research conducted as 
the first resettlement interviews were being 
conducted, but before any refugees were 
actually resettled. It outlines the primary 
groups likely to be affected and lays out the 
possible consequences – positive and negative 
– of resettlement on these groups. The report 
concludes with recommendations aimed to 
ensure that the resettlement process moves as 
smoothly as possible, and that, in its wake, there 
are systems in place to respond to the needs of 
concerned parties.
Introduction
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Research methods
Field research for this report was conducted 
during November and December of 2007, 
primarily in Kathmandu, Damak and three of 
the seven refugee camps: Beldangi I, Beldangi 
II and Beldangi Extension. The report provides 
an overview of the salient issues associated with 
resettlement, but does not address the specificity 
of each camp. 
Interviews were conducted with:
• officials from UNHCR and other UN agen-
cies, the International Organisation for Mi-
gration (IOM) and the Government of Ne-
pal (GoN); 
• representatives from the U.S. State Depart-
ment and the Australian Department of Im-
migration and Citizenship (DIAC);
• national and local staff from Lutheran 
World Federation-Nepal (LWF-Nepal), 
United Nations World Food Programme 
(WFP), Association of Medical Doctors of 
Asia-Nepal (AMDA-Nepal) and Caritas;
• journalists, filmmakers and independent re-
searchers; 
• local Nepalese businessmen and residents 
who live near the camps;
• refugees from the Camp Management 
Committees (CMCs) and camp-based com-
munity-based organisations (CBOs); and
• camp residents from various political, so-
cial and cultural groups, including refugees 
who are both supportive of and opposed to 
resettlement.
Given the sensitivity around the issue of 
resettlement, several precautions were taken to 
ensure objectivity. A local Nepalese student was 
employed as an interpreter, rather than a refugee, 
to reduce the likelihood that refugees would be 
reluctant to be interviewed. The research team 
used local transportation to travel to the three 
camps, rather than travelling in agency vehicles, 
to demonstrate its independence.
Refugees were assured of anonymity in all 
interviews, and a password-protected document 
was used to record all refugee information.
Quotations from refugee interviews have been 
attributed anonymously in this report, unless 
refugees gave their explicit permission otherwise. 
Several other stakeholders also requested 
anonymity.
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Background: the context of resettlement
Flight from Bhutan, the lack of alternative 
possibilities for long-term solutions and 
deteriorating camp conditions have all set the 
stage for mass resettlement of the Lhotshampa 
refugee population.5 
Flight from Bhutan
Bhutan’s southern Nepal-speaking population 
began leaving Bhutan in early 1990, in the 
wake of increasingly rigid citizenship laws 
and cultural/linguistic policies that favoured 
the ruling Dzongkha class at the expense 
of the Lhotshampa population.6 Protests by 
Lhotshampas during that time were followed by 
a swift crackdown by Bhutanese police, and soon 
after tens of thousands of Lhotshampas crossed 
the border into India and then continued on to 
Nepal. By September 1995, there were nearly 
90,000 Lhotshampas in Nepal.7 This fleeing 
population, and their children since born in 
eastern Nepal over the past 18 years, constitute 
the 107,000 Lhotshampa refugees currently 
registered in the camps in eastern Nepal.8 
No return possible
Several attempts to resolve the Lhotshampa 
refugee issue have floundered. Bilateral talks 
between Nepal and Bhutan intended to facilitate 
the return of some refugees to Bhutan resulted 
in claims by the Government of Bhutan (GoB) 
in June 2003 that only 2.4% of one camp’s 
population were ‘genuine’ citizens of Bhutan. 
Even this small number was not permitted 
to return, however. Camp residents were 
so incensed at how few Lhotshampas were 
determined to be ‘genuine’ that they attacked 
Bhutanese government officials who came to 
visit the camp, stalling any further discussion 
of repatriation.9 Not a single refugee has been 
permitted to return.
Difficult camp life
Local integration in Nepal for over 100,000 
refugees is currently not a possibility; while 
ethnic, linguistic and religious similarities with 
host communities in Nepal have permitted a 
de facto tolerance of some refugee movement 
and the possibility of low-paying daily labour, 
Lhotshampa refugees are generally confined 
to camps and unable to pursue secure 
livelihoods. Thus, the large majority remain 
dependent on international humanitarian aid. 
WFP provides food and runs income-generating 
activities in the camps, while UNHCR ensures 
that fuel and housing materials are provided to 
the refugee population. 
Over time, however, international donors 
have grown increasingly reluctant to continue 
funding a refugee situation with no end in sight, 
and, in light of Bhutan’s refusal to accept any 
Lhotshampas back into the country, programs 
initially designed to prepare refugees for 
repatriation have been scaled back. Agencies’ 
budgetary constraints have led to cuts in 
food, fuel, housing materials and clothing, 
exacerbating difficulties for the population.10
Even refugees with poor English skills know the 
words ‘languishing’ and ‘warehoused’ and use 
these terms frequently to describe their situation 
in the camps.11 A calamitous fire in early March 
2008 in Goldhap camp served as a stark reminder 
of the refugees’ vulnerability when, over the 
course of several hours, the fire destroyed 95 
percent of the camp’s structures and left most of 
the camps 9,770 residents homeless.12
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A preliminary examination of the Lhotshampas’ 
social background, residence and movement, 
and citizenship status provides a current context 
to inform the key issues that are surfacing as 
resettlement moves forward. 
Social background
Lhotshampas are a relatively well-educated 
refugee population. Prior to flight, their education 
in Bhutan was generally of a higher level than 
that of their local hosts in Nepal. About 13% of 
registered refugees have an education past 10th 
grade13 and about 35% of camp residents can 
conduct their daily life in English.14 
UNHCR data record refugees’ occupations, 
which reflect either their employment as it 
was in Bhutan or as it is presently in Nepal. 
Nearly 13% of Lhotshampas reported working 
in agricultural jobs while another 13% reported 
being homemakers or housekeepers. These 
occupations, combined with more than 40% of 
the population reporting as students, comprise 
the vast majority of Lhotshampas. Other 
occupations include: tailors, educators, social 
workers, construction workers, engineers, artists 
and civil employees. 
Refugee residence and movement
By 1995, UNHCR had registered the entire 
Lhotshampa refugee population in the camps, 
since which time the population has remained 
relatively stable. Unlike other refugee situations, 
in which a continual stream of refugees from the 
source country can confound UNHCR’s rolls, 
the registration of Lhotshampa refugees has been 
relatively straightforward because there have 
been few new arrivals (with the exception of 
births) in the camps. The 2007 process of issuing 
identification cards to each refugee confirmed 
the stability of the Lhotshampa population. 
Refugees do, however, leave the camps, both 
during the day and for longer periods:15 
• Every morning, refugees ride their bicy-
cles out of the camps to participate in in-
formal daily (but irregular) wage labour. 
The availability of daily labour, and hence 
the number of workers exiting the camps 
daily, depends upon the season and the local 
The Lhotshampa refugee population today
Refugees returning from daily labour, Beldangi camp, Dec 2007. Photo by the author.
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A Piece of History: Remembering the Berlin Wall
Refugees lose not only their physical territory when they flee, but often, their claim 
to individual histories, which become subsumed by un-nuanced humanitarian 
narratives that simplify and objectify their pre-flight experiences. But refugees 
have rich and detailed individual histories, ones that demonstrate that, prior to 
flight, they were often in positions of power, wealth and prestige. Thus it should 
come as no surprise that among the Lhotshampa refugee population are those 
with experiences that defy stereotypes of refugees as victims. One former camp 
secretary used to play basketball with the King of Bhutan. Another served on the 
King’s Royal Advisory Council. A third participated in a Bhutanese government 
delegation in Germany in 1989. When he fled Bhutan less than a year later, he 
brought with him a piece of the Berlin Wall, which he keeps to this day in his 
refugee camp hut.
economy, but it is estimated that thousands 
of refugees work daily in nearby fields or 
construction sites, where they earn between 
50 and 120 rupees per day ($.77 to $1.85 
USD).
• An estimated 1,000 refugees travel to India 
seasonally, to take jobs or study in schools 
there.
• It is estimated that hundreds of refugees live 
in Kathmandu, where, with a good educa-
tion, they work in higher-paying jobs. 
• Some refugee students attend local schools 
far enough away from the camp that they 
do not return each night, but instead, stay in 
nearby towns.
• Thousands of educated English speakers 
work in boarding schools throughout Ne-
pal, where they provide a helpful boon to 
Nepal’s English-speaking teacher force. 
• More than 100 refugee families are regis-
tered with the GoN who live officially out-
side of the camps, most of whom are politi-
cal leaders.16
Nepal’s qualified tolerance to its refugee 
population in permitting such movement 
compares favourably to other refugee situations 
where camps are more restrictive. Nevertheless, 
refugees report being exploited by local bosses 
because of their precarious status.17 In addition, 
refugees’ freedom of movement is contingent on 
the GoN, which can, and has, blocked exit from 
and entry to the camps at a moment’s notice, 
most recently during the April 2008 elections, 
when officials were concerned that refugees 
might try to cast proxy votes in the name of other 
voters.18
Citizenship status
In theory, any refugees obtaining citizenship 
in Nepal should no longer be registered in the 
camps. But some registered refugees have 
tried to gain citizenship status through false 
documents. Others have managed to secure 
Nepali citizenship by obtaining ‘real documents 
the wrong way.’19 And still others have gained 
citizenship through intermarriage.
Refugees with ‘secret’ citizenship are obviously 
reluctant to discuss their status, so it is difficult 
to estimate the numbers of those who have it. 
But several interviewees surmised that those 
with some form of citizenship may be less eager 
to resettle because they have put down roots in 
Nepal.20 It may also be that such refugees plan 
to resettle only parts of their families, viewing 
resettlement as another form of labour migration. 
(See section entitled ‘Uninformed migration 
choices,’ p. 10.) 
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Since the resettlement offer first emerged in 
2006, refugees’ conflicting opinions about 
resettlement have resulted in a highly charged 
camp atmosphere in which hope, resentment, 
and anxiety have all played significant roles. 
Conflicting opinions
At stake for those who oppose resettlement is the 
loss of their political movement, the loss of their 
community and the loss of the dream of returning 
to Bhutan. ‘We have worked for so many years 
to make repatriation a reality,’ lamented one 
refugee. ‘With resettlement, I fear that we will 
give it all up.’21 
Implicit in this view is the opinion that the 
option of resettlement is disastrous, not only 
for those who espouse it, but for everyone, 
because declining numbers of refugees in 
the camps lessen the urgency of promoting 
repatriation. Thus ‘anti-resettlement’ refugees 
have discouraged resettlement in a number of 
ways, from publishing statements to issuing 
threats to engaging in actual violence against 
‘pro-resettlement’ refugees. (See next section 
entitled ‘Anti-resettlement activity.’)
For their part, pro-resettlement refugees want 
to be able to promote, discuss and apply for 
resettlement openly. Some insist that anti-
resettlement refugees only care about losing 
power while others accuse anti-resettlement 
factions of being self-serving. ‘They have land, 
money, maybe even citizenship here in Nepal,’ 
asserts one refugee. ‘For them, it is no problem to 
stay and they want the rest of us to stay too.’22 
A more sympathetic view of anti-resettlement 
groups may instead label them ‘pro-
repatriation’ as their aim is to shift the focus 
of the international refugee regime away 
from resettlement and toward repatriation. 
‘Repatriation was the entirety of their political 
career,’ notes one journalist. ‘If the refugees go, 
their constituency is gone.’23 
Anti-resettlement activity
Several stakeholders, including UNHCR 
officials, NGO employees and other agencies 
estimate that there are no more than about 
a hundred people actively opposed to 
resettlement. Whether this number is accurate 
is difficult to ascertain, but it is certain that the 
anti-resettlement presence has made itself 
known in powerful ways. 
First, camp elections in 2007 shifted the 
power dynamics in the camps. Prior to these 
elections, most refugees elected to the Camp 
Management Committee (CMC) were pro-
resettlement or neutral. In 2007, however, a new 
round of camp elections ushered in an almost 
entirely pro-repatriation/anti-resettlement slate 
of CMC officers. There were allegations that 
pro-resettlement candidates were intimidated 
into not standing for election, but these could not 
be substantiated.24 Since the CMC is one of the 
most effective channels to deliver information 
to camp residents, a lack of cooperation on the 
CMC’s part could impede the distribution of 
resettlement information.
Second, several stakeholders claim that anti-
resettlement leaders have influenced young 
refugees who are susceptible to manipulation. 
The then-Country Director of UNHCR’s Nepal 
office noted that ‘youth are being persuaded 
by elders to act violently…. They encourage 
this rebellious attitude.’25 This oft-repeated 
argument, however, is undermined by new 
research that contends that Lhotshampa refugee 
youth are not being manipulated by others, but 
are, instead, educated, competent and rational 
actors who have embraced political groups 
advocating violence at the same time that they 
promote human rights and children’s rights in 
the camps.26 This argument indicates that anti-
resettlement youth may have given careful 
thought to the possibility of resettlement, and 
may continue to reject it categorically even after 
Camp Atmosphere
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exposure to UNHCR pamphlets and information 
sessions.27 It may also indicate that there are more 
than 100 anti-resettlement activists, because 
youth may be taking the initiative to pursue 
anti-resettlement activities, rather than only 
following the orders of leaders. 
Third, pro-resettlement refugees (i.e., those 
who have welcomed visiting delegations 
and/or personally expressed an interest in 
resettling) have been threatened. ‘There are 
lots of handwritten notes,’ asserts one refugee. ‘I 
have found a note in my hut that says, “We will 
end your life if you choose to resettle.” They are 
genuinely playing an emotional game with people 
that have nothing.’28 An article in the Himalayan 
News Service reported that in November 2007, 
sixty-two refugees appealed to the police for 
protection after receiving death threats. The 
article reported that the anti-resettlement groups 
‘told the refugees that they will be forgiven and 
allowed to remain in peace if they recant from 
their pro-(re)settlement stance.’29
Fourth, pro-resettlement refugees have been 
subject to attacks on several occasions. These 
attacks underscore the depth of the resentment 
that resettlement has wrought:
• In May 2007, the pro-resettlement secretary 
of Beldangi II was attacked for espousing 
resettlement openly. In the ensuing clash, in 
which Nepal’s Armed Police Force (APF) 
protected the secretary, one refugee was 
killed.30 
• In December 2007, one individual inter-
ested in resettlement was shot in the town 
of Damak, indicating that violence associ-
ated with resettlement is not confined to the 
camps themselves. The group that claimed 
responsibility for the attack claimed that its 
actions were specifically geared to ‘foil’ re-
settlement.31
• In early May 2008, nine masked men at-
tacked an IOM bus that was carrying refu-
gees being processed for resettlement, an in-
cident that ‘shocked’ UNHCR. The bus was 
substantially vandalised and the driver and 
some of the refugees inside were injured.32 
Fear and insecurity
The threat of and actual violence surrounding 
the resettlement issue have further inflamed 
and divided the refugee community and 
created an undercurrent of fear in the refugee 
camps. ‘We are scared even to express interest in 
resettlement. There is no privacy in the camps and 
even if we run to (the) UNHCR office in town to 
ask questions, people can talk about us…. People 
want information but they are afraid to ask.’33
The tension between pro- and anti-resettlement 
factions is made worse by the fact that each side 
claims that the other manipulates the truth to 
achieve its aims.
• Anti-resettlement groups allege that refugees 
who want to resettle actually manufacture 
threats to demonstrate false vulnerability as 
a way of expediting their own resettlement 
claims. ‘They will pay a radical boy 12 thou-
sand rupees (nearly $200 USD) to dismantle 
their hut, just so that the victim will be reset-
tled first,’ explained one refugee leader.34 
• Pro-resettlement refugees accuse anti-reset-
tlement groups of manufacturing evidence 
to try to prevent resettlement. Knowing that 
most resettlement countries will likely not 
resettle anyone who has been involved in 
violent activity, anti-resettlement groups can 
easily jeopardise an applicant’s chances for 
resettlement by suggesting affiliation with 
insurgent groups. Such evidence can easily 
come in the form of a receipt for a contribu-
tion to one of several communist or Maoist 
groups. Over the past several years, thou-
sands of Lhotshampa refugees have donated 
to these organisations, either willingly or 
through fear or coercion.35
Violence and the fear of violence have polarised 
the camps somewhat, but it is important to 
remember that the majority of camp residents 
do not fall neatly into the pro- or anti- 
resettlement factions. Many families want to 
decide their futures together, and have, until the 
present, not made up their minds. The next few 
years will be very difficult for these refugees 
as they navigate the needs of family, the 
opinions of friends and pressures from anti-
resettlement groups.
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Lack of information 
Despite concerted efforts by UNHCR to conduct 
information campaigns for all camp residents 
beginning in November 2007, including the 
distribution of UNHCR information pamphlets 
in local languages and in English, refugees 
lack information about many aspects of the 
resettlement process.
Threats and violence have also meant that some 
refugees fear asking questions about resettlement 
in a public forum. There are even indications 
that some individuals publicly opposed to 
resettlement have, in private, requested it, 
indicating how unwilling people truly are to 
express their interest in resettlement openly.39 
Under such circumstances, where refugees feel 
uncomfortable both expressing interest in 
resettlement and asking questions to alleviate 
their concerns, it is not surprising that rumours 
have thrived. (See box entitled ‘Resettlement 
Rumours,’ p. 9.)
While some blame anti-resettlement groups for 
the circulation of such rumours, it is certainly 
Mislabelling Maoists
Stakeholders and refugees themselves commonly fail to differentiate between Maoists, their 
Bhutanese counterparts from the Bhutan Communist Party (BCP), anti-resettlement activists, 
and other political groups interested in promoting change in Bhutan. Differentiating between 
these groups is important, however, in order to develop effective policies that respond to 
their discrete goals and needs.
The Maoists have waged a long insurgency against Nepal’s monarchy, and in April 2008, 
won the most seats of all parties in Nepal’s democratic elections. Several reports have 
suggested that the Maoists are responsible for the strength of the BCP in the camps, through 
recruitment and training.36 
The BCP has called for democratic reform in Bhutan, including the repatriation of ‘all its 
citizens’ through armed struggle.37 Its members are also publicly anti-resettlement. In May 
2007, the BCP prevented UNHCR from meeting with camp residents about resettlement and 
took responsibility for the 13 December shooting of a pro-resettlement refugee.38
Groups opposed to resettlement engage in actions and use language that may be either 
stridently anti-resettlement or temperately pro-repatriation. Anti-resettlement activities 
may be associated with the BCP, but not necessarily. Pro-repatriation groups also include 
the Bhutanese Refugees Representatives’ Repatriation Committee (BRRRC), which has 
organised petitions, rallies and hunger strikes to call attention to the issue of repatriation.
Numerous political groups are working to promote change in Bhutan. Some want to end the 
monarchy while others are pushing for democratic reforms that will improve the treatment of 
minorities. Some espouse violence while others promote only peaceful means of protest. 
It is important to recognise that while the activities of these groups may overlap, the groups 
themselves are not inter-changeable. Many refugees who are not Maoists or BCP members 
have participated in protests against the GoB, not all anti-resettlement activists are Maoists 
or members of the BCP, and not all political groups advocating change in Bhutan are anti-
resettlement.
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Resettlement Rumours
• Refugees are being ‘sold’ to resettlement countries for slave labour
• Resettlement countries will not take applicants who are old and infirm
• Refugees will be forced to fight in Iraq for the U.S. military
• A button on the airplane will eject refugees when the airplane flies over the 
ocean
• Pro-resettlement individuals received money from UNHCR to say positive 
things about foreign countries
• India promotes resettlement because it wants to send the refugees far away
• After several years, resettlement countries will force refugees to move once 
again, to another country
the case that many rumours are based on 
misunderstandings. For example, males over 
18 resettling to the U.S. (from any country) are 
required to sign a declaration that they are willing 
to be drafted into the U.S. military. This has led 
to rumours that refugee youth are forced to join 
the U.S. army upon arrival.40 ‘There is a grain 
of truth in almost every rumour,’ notes David 
Derthick, IOM Resettlement Officer for Nepal. 
‘That’s why it’s so difficult to undo them.’41
Confusion and anxiety
There is also confusion surrounding the 
process of applying and interviewing for 
resettlement. Depending on the resettlement 
country, refugees may be asked to meet with 
different personnel (UNHCR, resettlement 
country representatives and IOM staff) as many 
as five times. The process, from first interview to 
flight departure, is expected to take six months 
on average, if no extenuating circumstances 
present themselves. But some refugees confuse 
an expression of interest (made by letter or in 
person at UNHCR) with an interview, and the 
wait thereafter feeds their anxiety. 
Further, situations of polygamous marriage, 
separated children and extended families 
complicate the resettlement process.42 While 
such complications do not necessarily stop 
resettlement, but only slow it, refugees who 
are impatient to leave, or fear remaining in the 
camps after they have expressed their wish to 
resettle, have discussed feelings of nervousness 
and fear because resettlement doesn’t occur 
immediately.43
Because the resettlement process is just 
beginning, refugees’ fears of being left behind 
have not yet materialised. Over time, however, 
refugees may be rejected for a variety of reasons: 
medical problems, participation in insurgent 
forces, or other particularities having to do 
with resettlement country policies. It can be 
anticipated that rejected refugees (or those who 
do not resettle because family members have 
chosen not to) will undergo stress and depression, 
as has been documented in other refugee camps 
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where populations are left behind.44 Because 
several resettlement countries are committed to 
taking large numbers of Lhotshampa refugees, 
the phenomenon will likely not be as widespread, 
as, for example, in Dadaab camp in Kenya, 
where the percentages of refugees who are 
actually accepted for resettlement are miniscule. 
Nevertheless, refugee depression and anxiety, 
already a cause of concern in the camps, may 
increase significantly in such situations.
Uninformed migration choices
Anxiety also stems from ambivalence about 
what resettlement exactly means. UNHCR’s 
resettlement pamphlet explains that ‘Persons 
accepting and departing Nepal on resettlement 
will no longer be considered as refugees in 
Nepal, and will not automatically regain refugee 
status if they return to Nepal. They will be legal 
permanent residents and eventually if they 
choose, citizens of the country they are resettled 
[sic].’45 But for the Lhotshampas, who had their 
citizenship status taken away in Bhutan, the 
statement in UNHCR’s pamphlet may not imply 
a permanent solution. 
Several discussions with refugees revealed 
that some households are considering breaking 
families apart to send the young for education 
and/or jobs.46 These possible choices indicate 
that some refugees view resettlement as 
another form of labour migration, in which 
working-age family members are expected to go 
abroad for the express purpose of making money 
to send back remittances to the rest of the family. 
While it is indeed hoped that remittances will 
form an important part of the future remaining-
refugee economy (see section entitled ‘Informal 
income,’ p. 15-16), resettlement strategies that 
view resettlement as a form of periodic migration 
are likely to be problematic.
Glimmers of hope
Although few refugees will discuss the matter 
publicly, resettlement has raised the hopes 
of many refugees. Some ask questions that 
reveal an eagerness to begin a new life outside 
the confines of a refugee camp, expressing 
excitement and apprehension in the same breath. 
‘The UN told me that life will be easy in a new 
country. But what will happen to me if I can’t get 
a job?’ asked one.47
Similarly, some parents (particularly the 
educated) who have watched their children lose 
out on educational and economic opportunities 
are focused on ensuring a better future for their 
children.48 And local news sources have reported 
that refugees who intend to resettle are more 
positive and hopeful than they have been for 
years.49 
While these impacts on morale are indeed 
positive, it is important to note that they offer 
hope to those resettling, rather than to the 
remaining population.
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Painting a tentative profile of those who will 
resettle and those who will remain is useful in 
anticipating how resettlement is likely to affect 
remaining populations. Similarly, determining 
which refugees will resettle sooner rather than 
later is important because of how such population 
changes will alter the character of the camps 
in the 5+ interim period while resettlement is 
ongoing. Early data analysis reveals that a higher 
proportion of educated and skilled refugees 
will be among the first to resettle, and elderly 
populations and other vulnerable populations 
will not be left behind.
Education
Data provided by UNHCR reveals the tendency 
of the best educated to be more interested in 
resettlement. As of April 2008, more than 74% 
of refugees with a post-graduate education have 
expressed an interest in resettlement, compared 
to 27% of all camp residents. As a similar study 
of the resettlement of refugees from Burma out 
of Thailand found, 
the educated want to resettle in higher 
percentages than the total camp population 
(emphasis added). They are less intimidated 
by the outside world, and they believe that 
because of their jobs in the camps and/or 
their English abilities, they will be able to 
secure better jobs in third countries. The 
members of this group also have more 
access to information about resettlement 
within the camp community simply because 
of their daily contact with the outside 
world.50 
Likely resettlement profile
Source: UNHCR-Nepal resettlement statistics, April 2008. Used with permission.
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The data indicate that refugees with higher levels of education 
are more likely to resettle sooner. For example, 74% of all post-
graduates have expressed an interest in resettlement, while only 
21% of those with no education have. And 45% of all post-
graduates have already had their applications submitted to 
resettlement countries, while only 11% of those with no education 
have had their applications submitted.
Education and Resettlement Activity
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UNHCR screens all refugee expressions of 
interest and then submits them to resettlement 
countries. It is currently working through the 
backlog of all refugees who have expressed an 
interest and, as of April 2008, has submitted to 
resettlement countries about 50% of those who 
have expressed an interest. The data show that 
UNHCR is not showing preference toward one 
particular education level over another. (See 
chart entitled ‘Education and Resettlement 
Activity,’ p. 11).
It is too early to analyse whether some 
resettlement countries will be involved in 
‘cherry-picking’ – i.e., accepting for resettlement 
only the most highly skilled and best educated 
of all applicants. The U.S., which is accepting 
by far the largest number of Lhotshampas, is 
well-known for inclusive refugee policies and 
does not selectively filter by education or skill 
level. Total numbers accepted, however, is not 
an indication of whether or not a camp will be 
drained of its best educated and most highly 
skilled workers. For example, less than 1%, or 
about 900 people from the Lhotshampa camps, 
have a post-university education level. But if 
one country – even one that only resettles small 
numbers of refugees compared to the U.S. 
– accepted 450 post-university graduates, it 
would halve the best educated population in one 
year. UNHCR is alert to the dangers of cherry-
picking and tries to juggle the expectations of 
both resettlement countries and refugees, but it 
cannot entirely prevent resettlement countries 
from selecting refugees based on their ‘local 
integration potential.’ 
Experience
Humanitarian agencies are not only worried 
about losing their best educated workers, but 
those with the most experience. There are four 
types of occupations for which applicants 
Source: UNHCR-Nepal resettlement statistics, April 2008. Used with permission.
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The percentage of health workers, clergy, managers, and 
educators interested in resettlement and being submitted for 
resettlement is much higher than the average for all 
refugees.
22.9%
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have a significantly higher rate of interest and 
submission than the total camp population: 
health workers, clergy, managers and 
educators. It seems likely that these individuals 
will resettle early in far greater proportions 
than the total population, possibly affecting 
the three main sectors of camp life: health, 
camp administration and education. (See 
chart entitled ‘Refugee Career Categories with 
High Resettlement Activity,’ p. 12.)
Gender and age
UNHCR’s data also show resettlement activity 
by gender and age. Thus far, males and females 
and refugees across different age groups have 
expressed an interest in resettlement and been 
submitted in similar percentages; the data show 
no specific trends. (See ‘Resettlement Interest by 
Age and Gender,’ below).
This data supports the prediction of one staff 
member from IOM, who noted that Lhotshampa 
families are tightly-knit units and will likely 
resettle three or four generations at one time. 
Grandparents and great-grandparents will be 
among those to be resettled, so that they won’t 
be left without care in the camps. ‘Resettling 
such elderly refugees is a new challenge for 
resettlement agencies. In Africa, there were so 
few elderly refugees at all.’51
An extrapolation from this early data 
and associated predictions may negate 
aforementioned concerns about large numbers 
of refugees breaking up their families in pursuit 
of economic livelihood decisions (See section 
entitled ‘Uninformed migration choices,’ p. 10.)
Caveats
While these data illuminate some of the possible 
challenges that the remaining population will 
face, there are two important caveats to bear 
in mind. First, because of the aforementioned 
tension in the camps at present, expressions of 
interest in resettlement today cannot accurately 
reflect what is to come in the following months 
and years. Many refugees may be taking 
a ‘wait-and-see’ approach and will only 
express their interest after the first wave of 
refugees has resettled and sent reports (and 
remittances) back to the camps. This second-
wave phenomenon may well shift current 
trends.
Second, there are variations in terms of 
education level and resettlement interest 
among the seven camps. In addition, there 
is variation within each camp. Some sectors 
are more likely to be interested in resettlement, 
while others eschew it. Intuitively, such variation 
makes sense, because refugees who live close 
to one another may be more likely to attend the 
same meetings and be exposed to the same kinds 
of visitors, be they anti-resettlement activists or 
resettlement officials. Thus, it is important to 
recognise that certain areas of each camp can 
easily be neglected. Despite the fact that camps 
are relatively small places and the populations 
therein are limited in their movement, even 
after 18 years, it is estimated that only 30% of 
the camp population has ever visited a camp 
office to make requests, communicate needs 
or make complaints,52 indicating that certain 
camp populations can easily be marginalised or 
isolated.
 
Resettlement Interest by Age and Gender 
 
Ages 0-18 
 
Ages 18-59 
 
Ages 60+ 
M F Total M F Total M F Total 
23% 23% 23% 29% 30% 29% 28% 28% 28% 
 
Average: 27% of all refugees expressed an interest in resettlement 
Source: UNHCR-Nepal resettlement statistics, April 2008. Used with permission  
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There are three primary areas on which 
resettlement may have positive or negative 
impacts for remaining camp residents: goods 
and services; the increase or decrease in informal 
income; and the security environment. This 
research reveals that resettlement has the potential 
to improve or pose additional challenges in all 
three areas.
Goods and services
Humanitarian agencies working in the camps are 
concerned with how resettlement will change 
the provision of goods and services therein. 
One positive impact is that as more people 
resettle, physical camp facilities such as 
housing, medical clinics or libraries will be 
less overcrowded and there will be a lower 
overall demand for common goods (although 
food and fuel rations will be adjusted according 
to changes in the population). For example, 
several refugees have noted that it will be less 
burdensome to share public items, such as solar-
powered cookers, when there are fewer people 
in the camps.53 
The looming negative impact of resettlement 
on camp services concerns the depletion of 
highly educated and skilled refugees who 
form the main core of camp service staff. This 
‘brain drain’ is a likely possibility given the 
analysis of UNHCR data that shows that these 
individuals are more likely to want to resettle 
first  (See section entitled ‘Likely resettlement 
profile,’ p. 11-13.) 
In Thailand, where refugees from Burma 
are resettling in proportions as high as those 
anticipated from Nepal, resettlement has 
presented a significant challenge for service 
providers. Many health workers, teachers 
and administrators have departed, leaving 
humanitarian agencies in the difficult position 
of trying to provide quality care with far fewer 
experienced and skilled workers.54
Humanitarian agencies in Nepal have similar 
concerns, but there are several reasons why the 
depletion of skilled and experienced workers 
will likely be less worrisome in the Lhotshampa 
camps than in Thailand. 
• UNHCR, partially learning from its mis-
takes in Thailand, has streamlined the re-
settlement process in Nepal so that resettle-
ment is occurring more quickly. While this 
gives humanitarian agencies less time to 
train new recruits, the overall population is 
resettling faster, so that fewer workers will 
be required. 
• Because Lhotshampas speak the same lan-
guage as their hosts, it is easier for humani-
tarian agencies to work with local staff to 
fill positions in the camps, rather than re-
cruiting from overseas. 
• There is a deep pool of recruits from which 
humanitarian agencies can draw once 
camp-based staff start to resettle, because 
‘there has been education turnover and re-
training for years.’55 One agency employee 
estimates that about 15% of the currently 
unemployed camp population speaks Eng-
lish, making it easy to recruit and retrain 
replacements as the current working popu-
lation departs.56
While Nepal may fare well compared to Thailand, 
national staff from the education and health 
sectors in Nepal recognise the possibility of 
brain drain.
The health sector relies on Nepalese doctors 
employed by AMDA for specialised care and 
trainings, and the experience of these doctors 
can help to fill gaps that occur when refugee 
Impact of resettlement on camp residents
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health workers begin to resettle. But preventive 
medicine and midwifery, both roles commonly 
performed by the refugees themselves, have 
the potential to decrease in quality if large 
numbers resettle. One AMDA physician noted 
that to avoid gaps in service, new trainings need 
to be implemented as soon as possible, not after 
most of the health workers have left.57  
Resettlement may pose serious challenges to 
the education sector. More than 60% of those 
who listed ‘education’ as a profession have 
expressed an interest in resettlement compared 
with 27% of the total population. Further, because 
of the sensitivity surrounding the resettlement 
issue, camp educators are not comfortable 
discussing their future resettlement plans. It is 
therefore difficult to predict which of the current 
950 schoolteachers and 250 administrators will 
remain in the camps in the intermediate and long- 
term, and if some camps will be more adversely 
affected than others.
According to one educator, the best strategy 
to address the loss of education staff will be to 
continue the model of training that Caritas (the 
NGO that runs the education programs in the 
camps) has implemented for years: apprentice 
training where new teachers learn from more 
experienced ones in the classroom.58
Informal income 
Although humanitarian agencies provide 
food, fuel and housing materials to the refugee 
population, many families supplement these 
rations with additional income, often used to 
purchase fresh vegetables, additional housing 
materials, clothing and school supplies for 
children. Because much of this income is earned 
without the explicit permission of the GoN, it 
is difficult to estimate who brings it in, or how 
much. Without informal income, refugee 
quality of life would suffer. Likewise, an 
increase in such income would likely improve 
the standard of living of its recipients.
There are several factors that could influence the 
rise or fall of informal income:
First, some refugee income comes from 
incentive stipends given to camp-based 
workers, ranging from 728 to 1540 rupees 
($11.21 to $23.73 USD) per month. As a whole, 
this income will remain constant, or decrease 
proportionally as fewer workers are required to 
perform camp jobs. 
Second, daily wage labour brings a significant 
amount into the camps, which varies according 
to wages, the number of days one is able to 
find work and the percentage of the population 
working each day. Daily wage labour will 
remain constant if male adults who engage in 
such labour resettle in similar proportions as the 
rest of the population, as the current data indicate 
that they will. (See section entitled ‘Gender and 
age,’ p. 13.)
For a small number of daily labourers, however, 
resettlement has improved their wages in the 
short-term. The process of resettling tens of 
thousands of refugees each year has increased the 
demand for construction workers in the camps 
and even in Damak, near the Beldangi camps. 
Most of the construction workers building the 
IOM complex are refugees themselves. Many 
are now planning to resettle. ‘If we have to work 
so hard labour, we may as well be in the U.S.,’ 
one refugee construction worker reasoned.59
Third, there is income from refugees who work 
in the region, but further afield – such as in 
boarding schools throughout Nepal, high-skilled 
jobs in Kathmandu and various types of jobs 
in India. Such income is likely to decrease for 
three main reasons:
• Refugees in high-skilled jobs in Kathman-
du who choose to resettle will not be eas-
ily replaced by new refugee workers. One 
well-placed refugee estimated that 50% of 
all refugees living in Kathmandu are inter-
ested in resettling as quickly as possible.60
16          Bhutanese Refugees in Nepal: Anticipating the Impact of  Resettlement
• It is surmised that boarding school teachers 
will be among the first to resettle, because 
their English is excellent and so is their ex-
posure to the outside world. These are po-
sitions that will be harder for other camp 
refugees to fill in the future.
• Refugees who travel seasonally to India 
and other parts of Nepal have already cur-
tailed their travelling because they want to 
make sure that they are in the camps when 
UNHCR and resettlement countries con-
duct their interviews.61 Even families that 
are not sure if they want to resettle have 
called back members of the family working 
in India in order to discuss the resettlement 
situation.
Fourth, income is generated between and among 
refugee households by loans through the 
Bhutanese Refugee Women’s Forum (BRWF). 
If resettling households default on their loans, 
the remainder of the community will be forced 
to shoulder the burden. 
Fifth, there are thousands of women in the 
camps who earn small amounts of money 
through income generation projects such as 
weaving and sewing. These projects are likely to 
continue to bring in income, with little change 
as resettlement continues.
Finally, remittances from abroad represent the 
greatest potential for injecting the camps with 
additional income. Even if nuclear families 
resettle as a whole, it is likely that resettled 
refugees will continue to send money back for 
extended family and cultural events. Because 
resettlement has just started, there is no data 
to quantify what might be termed ‘resettlement 
remittances,’ but they are likely to share three 
characteristics:
• Remittances will probably not arrive im-
mediately since refugees will be occupied 
with integration and education in the first 
months of resettlement.
• Resettlement remittances will almost cer-
tainly be significantly higher in value than 
regional remittances that have come thus 
far.
• Resettlement remittances will likely arrive 
with less frequency than regional remit-
tances.
Supplemental income in the camps:
• Incentive stipends
• Daily wage labour
• Income from regional work
• Micro-loans offered through BRWF
• Income generation projects
• ‘Resettlement remittances’
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The complexity of these factors indicates that 
to fully quantify the income changes associated 
with resettlement, more research would be 
required. But most of these factors point to the 
fact that informal income in the camps will 
depend on household resettlement patterns. If 
the elderly remain in Nepal in higher proportions 
than the rest of the population, then income 
flowing into the camps will decrease per capita. 
Likewise, if working-age males remain in the 
camps in higher proportions, the total income to 
the camps will be higher. Using the categories 
above, agencies can begin to flag households 
for whom resettlement will represent a loss of 
income.
The security environment
Spates of violent attacks associated with the 
advent of resettlement in and near the refugee 
camps represent a clear deterioration of the 
security environment. 
Some stakeholders, however, observe a silver 
lining: the introduction of the Armed Police 
Force (APF), a professionalised and well-
trained force whose previous mission was to 
fight Maoist guerrillas. The APF was hired to 
man new police posts that were built in all of 
the camps to improve security in anticipation of 
resettlement.
One view holds that the APF is better trained 
and more professional than the previous police 
force that worked in the camps, and anecdotal 
evidence in the Beldangi camps suggests that 
non-political acts of violence (i.e., general 
crime) in camps may have decreased since 
APF’s introduction.62 This is partially because 
during the height of Nepal’s Maoist insurgency, 
there was virtually no police presence of any kind 
in the camps, and when the civilian police force 
was present, it did little to enhance the security 
environment in and near the camps. 
Individuals associated with anti-resettlement 
disagree with this assessment, however. They 
report that the APF has harassed, intimidated 
and detained some of their members, often 
without cause. ‘They have carte blanche to do 
whatever they want,’ complained one refugee. 
‘They just harass anyone in a radical group or 
anyone alleged to be in one.’63 Following the 
tension in recent months, the APF arrested five 
refugees associated with the anti-resettlement 
movement in February 2008, allegedly for 
destroying the hut of another camp resident.64 
Security is a double-edged sword for refugees 
who want to move freely throughout Nepal. 
The GoN has shown relative tolerance to 
refugee movement around the camp area and 
even in other regions of the country. But the 
violence associated with the anti-resettlement 
movement has led to sporadic restrictions, 
such as temporary curfews and prohibitions 
on leaving the camps.65 
While restrictions on refugee movement have 
been kept to a minimum thus far, recent events 
could change the security environment. If 
violence associated with resettlement continues 
to increase in the camps, the GoN may crack 
down harder on the refugee population, 
perhaps by limiting movement between camps. 
Conversely, the new government, not inclined 
to look favourably upon the APF, whose previous 
mission was to fight Maoist guerrillas, could 
recall APF soldiers from their posts in the 
camps, which could either minimise movement 
restrictions or breed further tension and 
violence. 
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One of the primary arguments in the anti-
resettlement arsenal is that resettlement will 
dilute the efforts of refugees who continue to 
promote political reform in Bhutan and who 
struggled for years to reclaim their citizenship. 
Despite the fact that UNHCR’s handbook insists 
that resettlement is ‘not intended to prevent 
you from repatriating to your home country,’66 
resettlement does represent both a physical and 
emotional dislocation from Bhutan. Further, in 
the absence of refugee camps, activists fear that 
all international attention focused on Bhutan 
will fade, and the dream of returning home will 
become ever more distant.
Tek Nath Rizal, a former political prisoner in 
Bhutan and one of the few public faces of anti-
resettlement, notes that the dilution of the 
movement will affect not only those who cannot 
return to Bhutan, but those who remain there 
today. There are between 60,000 and 120,000 
Lhotshampas still living in Bhutan, including 
political prisoners, those living under continued 
discrimination and those whose properties have 
been confiscated. ‘Promoting resettlement stops 
concerns for this population,’ Rizal warns.67 
A thorough May 2007 Human Rights Watch 
(HRW) report confirms Rizal’s assertions about 
the difficulties facing the internal Lhotshampa 
population. The report found that Lhotshampas 
in Bhutan live with the persistent fear of having 
their citizenship and rights to education, civil 
employment, and movement taken away.68 
While some have countered that resettlement 
will lead to new opportunities for advocacy and 
lobbying, injecting the movement with additional 
resources and media attention, the direct impact 
on the activities of democracy activists in Nepal 
has already been felt. This is partially because 
those who demonstrate vocally for democracy 
in Bhutan have been – justly or not – associated 
with those who oppose resettlement, and some 
members of pro-democracy groups have been 
detained or kept under close watch. 
In addition, funding for democracy groups 
has dried up. One group, the Human Rights 
Organization of Bhutan (HUROB), which 
tactfully straddles the resettlement debate, has 
been active for years in the camps. In 2006, 
however, as resettlement approached, HUROB 
lost its funding. ‘It’s hard to pay for our office 
and even for our telephone,’ says its acting 
chairman, S.B. Subba.69
The chief complaint of democracy activists 
about the resettlement process is that UNHCR is 
perceived to be working only toward resettlement. 
One anti-resettlement refugee explained that ‘the 
conflict in the camps is not a result of resettlement 
itself. It’s because all of UNHCR’s time is spent 
on resettlement, and none on repatriation. That’s 
where the conflict comes from.’70
UNHCR and donor countries insist that they are 
focusing on resettlement now as a sequencing 
strategy. That is, by relieving some of the 
pressure in the camps through resettlement, 
they hope to effectively lobby for repatriation 
thereafter.71 But there is a sense among some that 
Bhutan was moving toward repatriation in 2003. 
The attacks on Bhutanese officials were perceived 
as a momentary setback, rather than the end of the 
debate. Repatriation, some believe, would have 
surfaced again as a possibility, and resettlement 
has stopped that process in its tracks.72 
Finally, a number of refugees, including those 
who are eager to resettle, admit that recently, 
pro-democracy groups have been discouraged 
from engaging in political activities.73 This 
development, combined with the current focus 
on resettlement, further reinforces the fears of 
those who are concerned that repatriation is 
fading as a possibility. On the flip side, while 
UNHCR may restrict refugees’ political activities 
in Nepal (as it does in many host countries), 
political mobilisation and organising are generally 
permitted in resettlement countries.
It is too early to predict how resettlement will 
Impact on political mobilisation
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eventually alter the shape of Lhotshampa political 
mobilisation, and far too early to foresee whether 
such mobilisation will compel the GoB to allow 
the safe return of Lhotshampas to Bhutan. For 
the time being, however, acknowledging the 
legitimate concerns of anti-resettlement/pro-
repatriation refugees and tacitly supporting 
their continued struggle for political reform in 
Bhutan might relieve some anti-resettlement 
sentiment.
Impact on local community
Refugee influxes can have both adverse and 
beneficial effects on host communities. Refugees 
may compete with locals for employment, 
natural resources, and services.74 They may 
also generate new resources in the form of 
international assistance, economic assets, and 
human capital.75 In Nepal, local opinions of the 
refugee population range between a begrudging 
admission that refugees boost the local economy76 
to resentment at the depletion of local firewood, 
which, in February 2007, manifested itself in a 
clash in which one refugee was killed.77 
Just as refugees’ presence shapes local conditions, 
so too does their sudden departure. This is 
particularly so because mass resettlement occurs 
over a relatively short period of time and causes 
a spike, and then a steep drop, in the resources 
entering the local economies near the camps. In 
Nepal, it is anticipated that these impacts will 
be both positive and negative. 
The spike has already started. The resettlement 
process, requiring infrastructure for hundreds 
of expatriate staff to live, work, and comm-
unicate, has suddenly increased the demand for 
high- and low-skilled labour, accommodation 
and material supplies, particularly in Damak, 
the town closest to the Beldangi camps and the 
local headquarters of UNHCR and IOM. 
While a mass influx of foreigners and business 
means that some locals have experienced an 
increase in their wages, it is also the case that 
local prices and rents have increased. One 
long-serving staff member of a humanitarian 
NGO serving in the camps had to move out of 
his apartment when his landlord raised the rent to 
accommodate an expatriate staff member involved 
in the resettlement process.78
As the resettlement process continues, the need 
for expatriate staff will eventually decrease. 
At the same time, there will be fewer refugees 
participating in the local economy. When that 
occurs, humanitarian agencies would do well 
to heed the complaints and needs of local 
populations, who have already expressed 
resentment that they are not considered for 
resettlement. ‘They shared their firewood and 
schools with refugees for more than a decade, 
while refugees received free food,’ commented a 
local journalist. ‘Now they sit back and watch as 
everybody goes to the U.S. It’s not perceived as 
fair.’79 
The local community has also benefitted until 
now from hundreds of well-educated English 
speakers who have taught English at local 
schools throughout Nepal and especially near the 
camps. The likely resettlement of most of these 
teachers will represent an incalculable loss to 
local schools and to their students who have 
been studying English for years.
Finally, it is general humanitarian practice that as 
refugees depart, their huts are dismantled and extra 
supplies returned to the agencies that provided 
them. ‘It’s no good to let (local people) keep 
the tents, because then they want everything the 
refugees have – food, services, and resettlement,’ 
admitted one staff member of a national NGO.80 
Denying local residents supplies and services 
that they never had to begin with will not worsen 
their lives, but in a context where resettlement 
has already created resentment, efforts to work 
with local communities and transfer remaining 
resources to the local population would likely 
be welcomed by local residents and government 
officials.
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Synthesis
There are myriad advantages for those who want 
to resettle and who are accepted to resettlement 
countries, chief among them the opportunity to 
begin a new life outside the confines of a refugee 
camp.
For camp residents, political leaders and local 
residents who remain, resettlement presents both 
opportunities and challenges.
The potential positive impacts of resettlement 
include: more space and resources available 
for the remaining camp population; an 
increase in overseas remittances; a decrease 
in general crime due to the introduction 
of a trained police force; greater overseas 
support for political groups; and reduced 
tension between host communities and 
refugee populations over local resources and 
employment.
The potential negative impacts of resettle- 
ment include: confusion and anxiety 
associated with resettlement decisions; the 
depletion of camp-based workers, leading 
to a lower quality of camp services; a 
reduction in income from regional earnings; 
continuing resettlement-related violence 
among refugee camp residents; restrictions 
on refugee movement outside of the camps; 
a weakening of political groups’ claims 
to citizenship in Bhutan; and a long-term 
contraction of the local economy. 
(See table entitled ‘The Potential Impact of 
Resettlement: Positives, Negatives, and Policy 
Responses,’ p. 21.)
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The Potential Impact of Resettlement: Positives, Negatives, and Policy Responses
Impact on… Potential positives Potential negatives Possible policy responses 
Morale   Hope for those 
resettling 
 Tension and fear due to 
conflicting opinions about 
resettlement 
 Confusion about 
resettlement process 
 Anxiety and depression 
for those who are delayed 
or rejected 
 
 Distribute 
resettlement 
information widely 
 Heed signs of 
deteriorating mental 
health among camp 
residents 
Camp goods 
and services 
 Reduction in 
overcrowding 
 Common resources 
more widely available 
 Depletion of educated, 
skilled and experienced 
camp-based workers 
 Implement 
replacement trainings 
and apprenticeships as 
soon as possible 
Informal 
income 
 Increase in remittances 
from overseas 
 Reduction in income from 
local / regional work 
 Develop systems that 
facilitate overseas 
remittances 
 Be sensitive to 
sectoral / household 
variance in income 
reduction 
Security 
environment 
 Decrease in general 
crime in camps  
 Resettlement-related 
threats and violence 
 Restrictions on refugee 
movement outside of the 
camps 
 Monitor the security 
environment in and 
surrounding the 
camps 
 Promote government 
policies permitting 
refugee integration 
and movement  
Political 
mobilisation 
 Increase in overseas 
donations to political 
groups 
 Improved access to 
media in resettlement 
countries 
 Permission to protest 
publicly in 
resettlement country 
 Dilution of urgency of 
activists’ aims 
 Prohibition on protest 
activities in Nepal 
 Previously available 
resources channelled to 
resettlement initiatives 
 Continue to place 
pressure on the 
Government of 
Bhutan to allow safe 
and secure 
repatriation  
 Monitor the situation 
of those Lhotshampas 
who remain in Bhutan 
Local 
community 
 Reduced competition 
for local resources and 
employment 
 Short-term boost to 
local economy 
 
 Increase in local prices 
and rents 
 Long-term contraction of 
local economy 
 Loss of English teachers 
 No opportunity to acquire 
resettling refugees’ 
abandoned possessions  
 Resentment directed 
toward resettling refugees 
 Transfer extra 
resources to local 
population 
 Initiate programs that 
incorporate host 
communities’ needs 
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Policy recommendations
UNHCR and Resettlement Countries
Continue to improve the process of distributing 
information about resettlement, while also 
keeping in mind the need for privacy and 
confidentiality.
Share information about the timing •	
of the resettlement process as 
openly as possible, so that refugees 
prepare mentally and emotionally and 
humanitarian agencies can accurately 
anticipate their own organisation’s 
needs.
Consider creative ways to •	 distribute 
resettlement information that will 
supplement the information channels 
of the Camp Management Committee, 
such as movies, notes distributed with 
rations or random sector visits.
Follow the resettlement country selection process 
and advocate for selection criteria that does 
not result in ‘cherry picking.’ 
Monitor the security environment in and 
surrounding the camps, including the actions of 
Nepal’s Armed Police Force.
Promote government policies that continue to 
tolerate freedom of movement and enable 
refugees to pursue livelihoods outside of the 
camps. 
Humanitarian Agencies
Respond to potential ‘brain drain’ by 
implementing program responses as soon as 
possible.
Begin replacement trainings•	  early to 
ensure the smooth turnover of camp-
based jobs. 
Train apprentice workers•	  where 
possible. 
Communicate as openly as possible •	
with camp staff to anticipate staff 
decreases.
Given the possibility of depression, anxiety and 
confusion associated with resettlement, pay 
special attention to refugees’ mental health, 
which should be a key component of health care 
services.
Be sensitive to sectoral and household 
differences within camps, as decreases in 
services, rations or income may affect some 
parts of the population, or some families, more 
than others. 
Develop systems that encourage the easy 
flow of remittances back into the camps, such 
as developing relationships with local banks, 
experimenting with internet transfers, etc.
As of March 2008, the first group of Lhotshampa refugees resettled from 
Nepal. The process is expected to continue, sporadic anti-resettlement 
attacks notwithstanding. The following policy recommendations are intended 
to help stakeholders craft policies that reinforce the positive aspects of 
resettlement while developing policies and programs to address the negative 
consequences.81 
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Minimise impact of resettlement on local 
community.
Consider implementing programs •	
that incorporate host communities’ 
needs, such as allowing local residents 
to participate in training programs.
As refugees resettle, •	 consider an 
initiative to ‘green’ abandoned 
areas of the camp, encouraging 
refugees to plant gardens before they 
resettle and handing them over to 
local residents when refugees depart.
All parties
Given recent elections in both Nepal and 
Bhutan, closely monitor the political 
situation for signs of renewed violence from 
refugee groups or others.
De-escalate tension among the refugees by 
reaching out to all refugee stakeholders, 
including anti-resettlement leaders.
Continue to place pressure on the Government 
of Bhutan to allow the safe and secure 
repatriation of Lhotshampa refugees, 
while monitoring the situation of those 
Lhotshampas who remain in Bhutan.
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Acronyms
AMDA  Association of Medical Doctors of Asia
APF  Armed Police Force
BCP  Bhutan Communist Party
BRWF  Bhutanese Refugee Women’s Forum
CBO  Community-based organisation
CMC  Camp Management Committees
CWG  Core Working Group on Bhutanese Refugees in Nepal
DIAC  Australian Department of Immigration and Citizenship
GoB  Government of Bhutan
GoN  Government of Nepal
HUROB Human Rights Organization of Bhutan
HRW  Human Rights Watch
IOM  International Organization for Migration
LWF-Nepal Lutheran World Federation-Nepal
NGO  Non-governmental organisation
UNHCR Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees
WFP  UN World Food Programme
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When refugees resettle to new 
countries, populations left behind 
are affected. These include remaining 
camp residents, political leaders and 
local residents. Based on field 
interviews in Nepal, this briefing 
paper presents a preliminary forecast 
of the impacts to remaining 
populations of the mass resettlement 
of Bhutanese refugees currently 
residing in Nepal.
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